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ABSTRACT
The article examines the interactions of the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania with China in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) format. First, 
it explores three most widespread criticisms of the Chinese BRI approach, 
namely: 1. The risk of Beijing becoming legitimating factor for strains on 
democracy, freedom and the rule of law; 2. Support towards the Chinese 
interpretation of values and tolerance of censorship; 3. Debt arising from 
infrastructure loans. Further, the article tries to establish to what extent did 
the Baltic states remain resilient to them, offering possible explanations to 
the Baltic cases along three lines – systemic resilience, discursive resilience, 
and financial resilience. The article concludes that BRI is taking different 
shapes in different regions, and that local political culture along with wider 
supra-national organizations determines the range and response to BRI, 
therefore, national institutional frameworks in combination with overwatch 
from supranational standard-enforcing institutions are the leading factors 
of countries’ resilience to risks stemming from BRI. Methodologically, the 
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article employs qualitative approaches to data, including discourse analysis, 
document analysis and historic analysis. The primary sources include 
documents, agreements and statements of officials from China, the Baltic 
states, Italy, and the EU, as well as secondary sources including research 
publications, media reports, and mutually comparable national data.
The key words: Belt and Road, China, Baltic states, resilience, institutions.
Introduction
China’s engagement in the Baltic region first became visible 
after 2012, as the then-Premier Li Keqiang announced the “Twelve 
Measures for Promoting Friendly Cooperation with Central and 
Eastern European Countries”. Uneasy with being named “Eastern 
European”, the three Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia – 
agreed, however, to join the cooperation with China through a new 
format of exchanges: “Cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries”1. The cooperation vectors proposed 
by China included economy, education, cooperation on provincial 
and municipal levels, and people-to-people ties, such as tourism and 
education. The platform immediately caused concern in Brussels 
due to the fact that 11 original members of the format – Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia – were also member-states 
of the European Union.
The criticisms coming from the EU towards China only 
strengthened after all of the format members, including the Baltic 
states, joined the Belt and Road Initiative in 2016. The concerns 
of the EU amounted to several risks a more present China was 
posing to the countries of the platform – Beijing as a legitimating 
factor for strains on democracy; increased presence of the Chinese 
interpretation of values; and debt arising from infrastructure loans.
By 2018, the “16+1” format (called the “17+1” format after the 
accession of Greece in 2019) and BRI had not brought significant 
economic gains to the EU members that were taking part in the 
1 Renamed to “17+1” after the accession of Greece.
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cooperation, and views that the profile of “16+1” might be lowered 
by China were voiced by policy analysts (Poggetti &Weidenfeld, 
2018). Opinions arose that BRI will not last in Europe due to the lack 
of success stories and unmet expectations. Also, the year coincided 
with naming China as a threat in National Security reports of, 
first, Lithuania, then followed by Estonia and Latvia. Even though 
the Baltic states are still members of BRI, they have, however, 
expressed reservations regarding the “17+1” format (Baltics snub 
China’s Eastern Europe summit, 2021), which heavily overlaps 
with BRI in Europe, and Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
has explicitly raised questions as to the usefulness of “17+1” for 
Lithuania and Europe (Lithuania mulls leaving China’s 17+1 forum, 
expanding links with Taiwan, 2021). Given that BRI in the Baltics 
heavily hinges on providing Belarus access to the Baltic sea, and 
the strict Baltic position against A. Lukashenkо in the aftermath 
of August 2020 post-election protests (Sytas, 2020) makes such 
cooperation impossible, there are grounds to believe that the regional 
importance of BRI will continue to decrease.
As the high wave of Baltic expectations and involvement 
with China seems to have passed, the Baltic experience serves 
as a valuable case of research into China’s BRI strategies and 
provides novel research material of relation-modelling vis-à-vis 
China. We maintain that BRI is taking different shapes in different 
regions, and that local political culture along with wider supra-
national institutional frameworks shapes the cooperation along 
the Belt and Road. Therefore, in order to avoid “divide and rule” 
outcomes, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
needs to work with the BRI members to increase the resilience of 
the local democratic institutions and to model China’s approaches. 
To illustrate the argument on local agency, the example of the Baltic 
states and Latvia in particular is offered here.
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Methodology
Methodologically, the article employs qualitative approaches 
to data, including discourse analysis, document analysis and 
historic analysis. The primary sources include documents, 
agreements and statements of officials from China, the Baltic 
states, Italy, and the EU, as well as secondary sources including 
research publications, media reports, and mutually comparable 
national data. This article draws on findings from a research 
project investigating the implications of China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative for the OSCE conducted by the OSCE Network of 
Think Tanks and Academic Institutions and funded by the 
German Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The article is a part 
of international collaborative project ‘China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative: Implications for the OSCE’, implemented by a team 
of international scholars, including this article’s author. The 
project objectives include: mapping the presence of China and its 
manifestation across Central Asia, the South Caucasus, the Western 
CIS, and the Western Balkans over time, in particular since the 
inception of BRI; identifying the implications that this presence 
has had in terms of economic, environmental, social, political and 
military security of the OSCE region; compiling and presenting 
a research report to inform OSCE institutions and participating 
state governments (China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Implications 
for the OSCE). As an output of the joint research project, this 
article adopts its general methodological approach towards the 
complex nature of the implications of China’s presence and 
activities in the OSCE region, and the acknowledgement of the 
difficulties of formulating and implementing an OSCE response. 
Yet it also views the “China challenge” as an opportunity for the 
OSCE response (Wolff, 2021).
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1. China and the Baltic states: history of interaction 
and expectations
In comparison to the other “17+1” and BRI counterparts, the 
Baltic states historically have the least experience with the PRC. 
Annexed by the Soviet Union in 1945, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Estonia were deprived of national foreign policy and did 
not possess even the limited sovereignty that Socialist states 
like Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and 
Albania exercised when they established diplomatic ties with 
the PRC in 1949 (FM attends reception to mark 70 years of 
diplomatic ties with 7 CEE countries, 2019). The Baltic region 
was only marginally involved in the Sino-Soviet friendship of the 
1950s, and the little ties that had emerged were severed during 
the Sino-Soviet split of the 1960s and 70s. A Chinese diaspora 
never developed in the Baltics.
The lack of historical contacts meant that the Baltics were 
latecomers to the Chinese market and the “17+1” was perceived 
as an instrument to get in on the economic opportunities – 
Eurasian transit, Chinese FDI, and market access – making up 
for the late start. 
Through diplomatic effort, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia made 
their immediate priority clear: the region needs to further diversify 
its logistic sector to make up for the steady decrease in freight 
flows via the port and railway infrastructure. Unlike the “Visegrad 
four”, the Baltic states did not put industrial revitalization on the 
cooperation agenda, and, unlike the Balkan states, both the Baltics 
and Visegrad did not see the need for Chinese investment in large-
scale non-automated or semi-automated production facilities 
as unemployment rates in these regions have been declining, 
reaching 6,5% and 4,1%, respectively in the 3rd quarter of 2019 
(Unemployment Rate, Europe, 2019).
Although the cooperation in both BRI and “17+1” has yielded 
modest results and no significant Chinese presence has transpired 
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in the Baltics (Berzina-Cerenkova, 2018), still, the three countries 
became involved in the controversy surrounding Chinese interests 
in the region along three perspectives. From a systemic perspective, 
China could become a legitimizing factor for strains on democracy 
and freedoms. From a discursive perspective, China could use the 
Baltics as a testing ground for a China-centric values discourse. 
Finally, from a financial perspective, the risk of entanglement 
through debt arose as China capitalized on infrastructure financing.
2. Baltic systemic resilience to the risk of Beijing 
becoming legitimating factor for strains on democracy, 
freedom and the rule of law
By labelling China “a systemic rival promoting alternative 
models of governance” (EU-China – A strategic outlook, 2019) in 
the 2019 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy Joint Communication to the European Parliament, 
the European Council and the Council, the fears were voiced that 
China would use its partnerships in Europe to legitimate democratic 
backsliding. Furthermore, it is argued that the BRI is highly consistent 
with the Chinese conception of the rule of law and may help further 
enhance it (Che, 2021).
Indeed, among the members of the China-CEE cooperation 
framework, a disturbing trend can be established – the NGO 
“Freedom House” has removed Hungary from the list of democracies 
and labelled it a “transitional/hybrid regime” in its “Nations in 
Transit 2020” report – the same category that accommodated Serbia 
and Montenegro, also China-CEE partners, a year earlier – whereas 
Poland has been taken out of the Consolidated Democracies category 
becoming a Semi-Consolidated Democracy (A snapshot of Chinese 
government influence, 2020). The report speaks of “China’s corrosive 
influence in the region”, naming technology transfers, emerging 
investments, infrastructure developments, elite co-optation, and media 
manipulation tools of such influence, and points out that China has 
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employed these tools in most members of China-CEE cooperation, 
including influence campaigns in the local media in the Baltic states 
(A snapshot of Chinese government influence, 2020).
The trend does not stop with the original members of China-
CEE grouping – the newcomer to the “17+1” and BRI member – 
Greece – is ranked 65th in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index. 
Malta, a signatory of BRI Memorandum of Understanding since late 
2018 (China, Malta sign MoU for B&R cooperation, 2018), stands 
even lower – it is ranked 81st, which is the second lowest EU score 
after Hungary – and sliding (Index details. Data of press freedom 
ranking 2020).
However, the Baltic states along with Slovenia are at the top 
of “Nations in Transit” 2020 score sheets when compared to the 
rankings of various members of BRI and “17+1” and steadily in the 
“Consolidated Democracies” category. The Baltics also enjoy the 
highest Press Freedom Indexes among all European BRI and “17+1” 
countries, with Estonia ranked 14th, Latvia – 22nd, and Lithuania – 28th. 
The Rule of Law Index 2020 points to similar conclusions, ranking 
countries based on accountability, just laws, open government 
and accessible and impartial dispute resolution. Estonia holds the 
10th position globally (Estonia Overall Score, 2020), higher than 
any other BRI or “17+1” country (Latvia and Lithuania were not 
included in the WJP 2020 Report). What accounts for such internal 
differences within the BRI and “17+1” partnerships, and, if such 
striking differences persist, can China’s influence really be the only 
factor causing democratic backsliding?
Regardless of engagement with China, governments and 
populations of the three Baltic states have been and remain explicitly 
Euro-optimistic and strongly rooted in the values of the Euro-
Atlantic community. According to Eurobarameter Spring 2019 
report, Lithuania is the most Euro-optimistic country in the EU, with 
72% of population trusting the EU, whereas Estonia is the 3rd, with 
60%. Latvia is somewhat lower, with 51%, but still on the optimistic 
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side of the spectrum (Trust in the European Union, national results 
and evolutions). Participation in BRI and “17+1” has not led to 
deliberations on an “alternative/parallel model” in the government, 
media, and society. In other words, the Baltics possess high systemic 
resilience to China’s influence.
There are three distinct characteristics of the Baltic political culture 
that could account for the systemic resilience – anti-authoritarian 
sentiment, Euro-optimism and pro-Atlanticism. Below, the anti-
authoritarian sentiment is analysed in connection to the domestic 
historical background, Euro-optimism is tied to the administrative 
structure of the Soviet period, and the Atlantic reliance is explained 
as determined by the current geopolitical situation.
The Baltic history of authoritarianism in the interwar period is 
perceived with unease, as it can be seen as an ultimate facilitator of 
the Soviet occupation. All three Baltic states experienced a period 
of home-grown authoritarianism: the first authoritarian coup took 
place in 1926 in Lithuania under Antanas Smetona. The coup of 
Konstantin Päts in Estonia on March 12, 1934 begun the so-called 
“silent era”, and was closely followed by the coup of Kārlis Ulmanis 
in Latvia on May 15, 1934. Although from a nostalgic perspective 
the authoritarian times in the Baltic are perceived as the years of 
economic growth, none of these regimes were efficient in the face of 
the Soviet occupation in 1940. The efficiency of resistance and the 
difference it would have made is still debated today, as the fate of 
the Baltics had already been pre-decided in the secret supplementary 
protocols of the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which stated: “In the 
event of territorial-political reorganization of the districts making up 
the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern 
border of Lithuania is simultaneously the border of the spheres of 
interest of Germany and the USSR” (Secret Supplementary Protocols 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 1939). Still, 
the three Baltic authoritarian governments made the controversial 
decision to succumb to the Soviet ultimatum and allow Soviet troops 
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into the Baltic states as troops of a friendly nation without military 
resistance – in stark contrast with the resistance of the democratic 
Finland under president Kyösti Kallio. It is the lack of military 
resistance that gives ground to claims that the Baltics joined the 
Soviet Union voluntarily and therefore were not occupied – and 
the fact that such a historical decision was singlehandedly made by 
a dictator is bitterly perceived among the Baltic societies, producing 
a certain safety-net against sympathies towards authoritarianism.
The Baltic Euro-optimism largely stems from the fact that the 
public opinion of the Baltic states does not hold any nostalgia towards 
the Soviet era. The status of Soviet Socialist Republics meant lack of 
political agency and autonomy, as well as the perception of Soviet 
power as the occupying, foreign force among the local populations, 
even more so after the crackdown on the National communists in 
the late 1950s. In addition to the identity and political factors, stands 
the economical consideration. Economic situation in the Baltics has 
improved considerably since the fall of the Soviet Union, especially 
after their accession to the EU: “Latvia’s GDP grew by 33% between 
2004 and 2007, growth reaching as much as 12% in 2006” (Pētījums 
par ekonomisko un sociālo situāciju Baltijas valstīs – Latvija, 2013). 
National economic growth was hindered during the financial crisis, 
but the EU proved useful yet again – during the economic hardship, 
the common labour market provided a much-needed exit strategy for 
hundreds of thousands of Baltic inhabitants.
The situation was different in the ex-satellite states. For example, 
in Hungary, just two years before joining China’s new initiatives, 
a staggering 72% respondents claimed that “most Hungarians 
are actually worse off now economically than they were under 
communism” (Wike, 2010), the highest rates among all post-Socialist 
countries, according to Pew Research Center. A decade later, albeit 
significantly lower, the number still stands at 31% – higher than 
Poland, Lithuania, and Czech Republic (Latvia and Estonia were 
not included in the report) (Wike et al., 2019). Admittedly, Poland 
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also scores high on EU satisfaction and “economic satisfaction in 
comparison with communism era” charts, therefore, the argument of 
Baltic exceptional Euro-optimism has its limitations.
Lastly, the Baltic states demonstrate a strong Atlantic reliance 
due to a complicated political and historic relationship with Russia. 
The example of Russian politics today and the authoritarian system 
under Vladimir Putin strikes a negative chord with the populations 
in the Baltics. The populations are keeping themselves up to date 
on the Kremlin rhetoric, because due to historical reasons the 
inhabitants of the Baltic states of all ethnic backgrounds, especially 
in the middle-age group, have a certain command of the Russian 
language, and Russian politics rank high on the agenda of the local 
media outlets. The authoritarian government in Russia is associated 
with the Russian revisionist approach, which in turn is perceived as 
a threat to Baltic sovereignty, leading Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia 
to conclude that there is no alternative to NATO and its principles, as 
it serves as a guarantor of the countries’ statehood. 
These three factors combined play the role of a vaccine towards 
authoritarian, anti-EU, and anti-NATO rhetoric, both home-grown 
and introduced. 
In the countries where democratic backsliding and decreasing 
rule of law is reported, a different set of domestic reasons and 
historic perceptions prevails, making Chinese corrosive influence 
only one piece of the puzzle. Based on the consistency of the Baltic 
position vis-à-vis the Euro-Atlantic system since the restoration 
of independence in 1991, the intensification of economic ties with 
Beijing is not likely to serve as a legitimating factor for strains on 
democracy in Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia. The relationship with 
China is perceived as an instrument of business diversification and 
is secondary to security relationships across the Trans-Atlantic 
community, exemplified by the decision of the Lithuanian President 
G. Nausėda against granting Chinese investors majority in Klaipėda 
port in 2019 amid security concerns (Jakučionis, 2019).
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3. Baltic discursive resilience  
to the Chinese interpretation of values
The previous chapter covered the situation surrounding democracy 
and the rule of law from domestic perspectives of countries involved 
in China’s multilateral formats of cooperation. This chapter shall 
focus on the situation surrounding discursive support towards 
China’s interpretation and wording of values in the Baltic states.
The core political values of the EU are clearly defined as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law – in accordance with 
the core principles and universal values of the UN. China agrees 
with these values as it positions itself rhetorically as an enthusiast 
of the UN-based multilateral system. In practice, however, the value 
perceptions on the European and the Chinese side differ. 
Up to the Xi Jinping era, the position of China was perceived 
as a defensive one, mostly centred around denying the accusations 
made by the European side. The turn towards agenda-setting in 
PRC-EU relations can be best seen from the 2014 China’s Policy 
Paper on the EU. It openly states that the situation does not satisfy 
China: “… the two sides have disagreements and frictions on 
issues of value such as human rights as well as economic and trade 
issues. China believes that these issues should be properly handled 
through dialogue in the spirit of equality and mutual respect and 
encourages the EU to move in the same direction”. But on top of 
the traditional disagreement China begins to proactively shape the 
wording and the values of cooperation, proposing “partnership for 
peace, growth, reform and civilization” (China’s Policy Paper on 
the EU, 2014).
The shift towards a more assertive outward value agenda had 
domestic roots. Even though aspects of the traditional Chinese 
culture, usually associated with Confucianism, but containing 
Legalist, Buddhist and Taoist thought as well, had been subtly 
introduced into Chinese political discourse during the decade long 
rule of Hu Jintao, Chinese values are playing a far more visible role 
in the messages of China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping. In the most 
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important speeches delivered by his predecessor Hu Jintao, e.g. 
Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, traditional allusions and 
keywords shaped in a classical linguistic manner had only been visible 
for those willing to trace their origins. In the official publications 
of Xi Jinping’s speeches and reports, in contrary, every traditional 
quote is put in parentheses and provided with an explanation, stating 
the meaning in contemporary Chinese, introducing the author and 
even contextualizing the current use (e.g. Xi Jinping talks about 
governing the country and managing politics, 2014). This suggests 
the importance that is given to the solidification of the Chinese nation 
through traditional values (or, shall we say, post-traditional values, 
since not all heritage has been included and not all of the included 
heritage is contextualized properly). Being a mere test run in Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao’s time, it is becoming a unified narrative in 
the years of Xi’s rule, shaping into an eclectic homegrown value 
message, containing traditional, Socialist and post-traditional 
values, and being presented as a unique characteristic as well as an 
achievement of the “Chinese way”. 
Appearing in close connection with the Chinese values discourse, 
is the promotion of the “civilizational” attribution of China, stressing 
that China is a civilization comparable to that of the whole Europe, 
rather than just a “nation” that could be perceived at the level of 
some European states. The extension of the post-traditional political 
discourse into the domain of the international affairs and using it to 
advocate for the perception of a nation as a separate civilization is 
a unique trait of the People’s Republic of China.
When Xi Jinping came to power in 2012 – 2013, he recognized 
the lack of a positive value agenda, stating that “appealing to values 
can be effective in maintaining social functioning and order” (How 
to present China’s core socialist values to the global community, 
2019). After an initial attempt at setting a positive value agenda with 
the “Chinese dream” phrase, its ambiguity and lack of distinctively 
Chinese discursive characteristics apparently was seen as 
a weakness, and the Xi Jinping administration shifted the emphasis 
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to a set of well-defined and strictly explained Chinese home-grown 
political and societal values, institutionalized within the form of 
“China’s keywords” [中国关键词] (e.g. China’s keywords, 2016) – 
a set of clearly defined and officially explained discourse elements 
containing a large portion of traditional quotes and meanings, the 
use of which is encouraged in official communication 1. These 
keywords contain an official argumentation towards the traditional, 
referring to the great culture, civilization and nation of China, e.g., 
“the Chinese Spirit” [中国精神], various forms of wenming [文明] 
(due to the lack of singular/plural distinction within the Chinese 
grammar and a wider semantic field of the notion, can be translated as 
nouns “civilization”/“civilizations”/”civility”, as well as adjectives 
“civil”/”polite”), ”Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” 
[中国特色社会主义], “the Silk Road Spirit” [丝绸之路精神], “the 
Four Confidences” [四个自信], and “the Core Socialist Values” 
[社会主义核心价值观]. The “core socialist values” – 24 characters, 
most rooted in Chinese traditional political and ethical philosophy, 
forming 12 words now known to all of China’s citizenry: prosperity, 
democracy, civility, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, the rule of 
law, patriotism, dedication, integrity and friendliness 2. They are 
further divided into three levels: the first four concern the nation, the 
next four are quests of the collective society, and the rest concern 
individual citizens (Zhou, 2018).
After the discursive background had been set, the values along 
with other Chinese official discursive concepts such as “community 
of shared destiny”, “dialogue of civilizations”, “Silk Road spirit” 
started to make their way into China’s outward communication, as 
both the Central government and Chinese state media were seeking the 
answer to the question “how do we apply these values in international 
1 It has to be noted that some of the mentioned elements have been introduced 
by Jiang Zemin, however, are increasingly being recontextualized and linked to 
“civilizational” properties during Xi Jinping’s rule.
2 In Chinese: 富强、民主、文明、和谐，自由、平等、公正、法治， 
爱国、敬业、诚信、友善. [“社会主义核心价值观基本内容,” 2014.
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communications to build a better image for China?” (How to present 
China’s core socialist values to the global community, 2019).
The growing discursive presence of Chinese values in outward 
communication has been noted and flagged outside China. The 
“Challenges to our values” section of the United States Strategic 
Approach to The People’s Republic of China states, in a somewhat 
harsh manner: “The CCP’s campaign to compel ideological 
conformity does not stop at China’s borders. In recent years, Beijing 
has intervened in sovereign nations’ internal affairs to engineer 
consent for its policies. PRC authorities have attempted to extend 
CCP influence over discourse and behavior around the world, with 
recent examples including companies and sports teams in the United 
States and the United Kingdom and politicians in Australia and 
Europe” (United States Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic 
of China, 2020).
However, although China is reportedly trying to influence 
companies, sports teams, and politicians, these efforts are not enough 
to turn around the prevailing discourse in existing institutional 
settings, such as EU-China High Level Strategic Dialogue, or OSCE-
China meetings. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the official PRC 
discursive concepts are most actively used in the multilateral and 
bilateral settings initiated by China itself, such as various documents 
of BRI and China-CEE cooperation, including the BRI Memorandum 
of Understanding.
Upon examining the project of the Memorandum Of 
Understanding Between the Government of the Republic of 
Latvia and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on 
Cooperation Within the Framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt 
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative, several keywords 
of the official Chinese political discourse are, indeed, visible in the 
preamble to the MoU: “Considering that China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative is committed to upholding the Silk Road spirit of peace, 
cooperation, openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning and win-
win cooperation while keeping such spirit enriched and upgraded, 
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facilitating exchange and integration of goods, technology, capital 
and personnel through cooperation and mutual learning among 
countries along the Belt and Road Initiative, promoting coordinated 
development and common progress of the two countries in economy, 
society, the environment and encouraging dialogue among different 
civilizations”1. Although access to other BRI memoranda signed 
with CEE countries is limited, secondary sources confirm that the 
Chinese values discourse was present in them, too.
The text offered to the Baltic partners differs significantly from 
the BRI MoU signed by Italy, which discursively resembles EU 
documents and has virtually no trace of official Chinese political 
values discourse (Memorandum of understanding, 2019). Three 
factors could account for the drastic difference between the two BRI 
memoranda: first, the Italian MoU was signed three years after the 
Latvian one, and perhaps the Chinese approach had changed; second, 
Italy had more leverage to negotiate the text; and third, China tried 
to use the CEE countries as a gateway for the introduction of its 
political values discourse in Europe.
Still, even though Chinese official communication towards 
the Baltic states in heavily laden with Chinese political value 
discourse in all sectors, the Baltic governments and public have 
proven to not be susceptible to them. Chinese political values have 
not entered the public discourse in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
The Baltic states explored the cooperation opportunities without 
subscribing to China’s normative BRI narrative, expressing 
interest only in the pragmatic value of Eurasian connectivity to 
their respective economies.
Furthermore, the Baltic states have remained faithful to the EU 
wording on value issues in communication with and on China. 
Several facts point towards the conclusion that the Baltic resilience 
1 Sic – only the project of the MoU is publicly available (Protokollēmuma 
projekts “Par Latvijas Republikas valdības un Ķīnas Tautas Republikas 
valdības saprašanās memorandu par sadarbību Zīda ceļa ekonomiskās joslas un 
21.gadsimta jūras zīda ceļa iniciatīvas ietvaros”).
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to the Chinese interpretation of values is higher than in other BRI 
and “17+1” members.
First of all, in July, 2019, all three Baltic Permanent 
Representatives to the UN signed a Joint Statement addressed 
to the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights, calling on 
China’s obligations as a Permanent Member of the Human Rights 
council to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and 
protection of human rights” in connection to the reports on large-
scale arbitrary detentions of Uighurs and other Muslim and minority 
communities (Letter to the United Nations Office at Geneva, 2019). 
None of the other members of China-CEE cooperation platform 
and BRI were signatories to the document.
Secondly, in May, 2020, an op-ed of 27 EU ambassadors to 
China was published in China Daily, omitting a phrase which was 
in the original text: “the outbreak of the coronavirus in China”. The 
European External Action Service had initially agreed to the cut, but 
apologized for this decision soon after and published the original text 
on its website. In response, multiple EU embassies re-published and 
set up Internet links to the original version. According to mapping 
conducted by Mercator Institute for China Studies, out of all EU 
countries involved in BRI and “17+1” cooperation in Europe, only the 
embassies of the three Baltic states along with Italy, Czech Republic, 
and Romania immediately republished the links to the original version, 
Slovakia followed a few days later, whereas Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria decided against it (Huotari, 2020). 
It would seem that the governments that choose to be discursively 
supportive or discursively unaccommodating towards the Chinese 
stance on values, such as those of Serbia and Hungary in the first case 
and those of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in the second, are doing 
so to serve their own political agendas, dictated by a pre-existing 
domestic setting, rather than by the Chinese pressure to do so.
The Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian example demonstrates 
that it is possible to be involved in a pragmatic dialogue with 
China without subscribing to Chinese keywords and discourse 
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on political values and remaining loyal to the EU value outlook. 
Nevertheless, unlike visible and immediate changes in the domestic 
political systems, such as the strains on democracy and rule of law, 
the narrative of the Chinese political values is a much more fluid 
phenomenon, and therefore the risk of the discursive resilience of 
the public domains of the Baltic states remains pronounced as long 
as the Baltics continue to engage in China-led formats.
4. Baltic financial resilience to debt arising  
from infrastructure loans
China’s lending practices along the Belt and Road and on the 
bilateral basis has been the recipient of the most vocal criticisms 
from international organizations, including the EU. The 2019 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the 
European Council and the Council states: “Chinese investments 
have contributed to the growth of many receiving economies. At the 
same time, these investments frequently neglect socioeconomic and 
financial sustainability and may result in high-level indebtedness and 
transfer of control over strategic assets and resources.” (EU-China – 
A strategic outlook, 2019).
Chinese researchers also acknowledge that debt risks arise due to 
the inexperience of Chinese financial institutions in the CEE region: 
“Especially in the Central and Eastern European countries, a region 
between developed countries and emerging market countries, 
China’s financial institutions still lack some experience in financing, 
which has led them to become one of the main bodies facing questions 
of the “debt trap” theory” (Liu, 2020).
As all three criticisms of China – systemic, discursive and 
financial – are interlinked, the Joint Communication establishes that 
the financial risks have the potential to spill over into systemic risks: 
“This compromises efforts to promote good social and economic 
governance and, most fundamentally, the rule of law and human 
rights” (ibid.).
28 LEX PORTUS   VOL 7   ISS 2   2021
Admittedly, the Baltic states never constituted the primary region 
for China’s infrastructure investment interests, still, during the early 
stages of both “17+1” and BRI, infrastructure financing appeared in 
all major documents.
When the “17+1” cooperation platform was first introduced by the 
then-premier of China Wen Jiabao in Warsaw, 2012, the infrastructure 
loans made up the core part of the offer, as it spoke of “establishing 
a USD 10 billion special credit line, a certain proportion of which 
will be concessional loans, with a focus on cooperation projects in 
such areas as infrastructure [..]” (Wen, 2012). The Chinese side also 
emphasized the requirement for state guarantees for such loans.
The EU member states involved in the platform, including the 
Baltic states, expressed that such a model of cooperation is not suitable 
to them for three reasons. First of all, as EU member states Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia have access to EU co-financing for infrastructure 
projects. EU co-financing is grant-based instead of loan-based and 
can make up to 85% of the project cost1. Under such circumstances, 
taking out loans to finance projects that can be covered from the 
EU budget made no sense. Secondly, the loan application procedure 
presented by the Chinese side initially demanded state-issued 
guarantees. According to EU law, guarantees linked to a specific 
financial transaction such as a loan are classed as constituting State 
aid (Commission Notice on the application of Articles 87 and 88 
of the EC Treaty to State aid in the form of guarantees, 2008), 
therefore, are subject to the Article 87 and Article 88 of the EC 
Treaty on aid granted by a member state. State guarantees for a loan 
issued to cover the operation of a Chinese company in Latvia would 
be considered competition distortion and thus incompatible with the 
common market (Inotai, 2020). Third of all, Beijing requested that 
the projects financed by Chinese loans would be partially granted 
1 E.g. the EU provides up to 85% of the total eligible costs for “Rail Baltica”– 
an infrastructure project of unprecedented scale in the Baltics with the total esti-
mated construction cost of EUR 5.8 billion (approx. USD 6,45 billion) (National 
and EU Contribution).
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to Chinese companies – the so-called “Chinese component” clause. 
In order to qualify for a loan, a country needed to guarantee a 50% 
Chinese component minimum, which would violate the EU law on 
public procurement.
All of the above made joint projects practically implausible, 
but not theoretically impossible. The only way to proceed with 
infrastructure cooperation on Chinese terms for the Baltics would 
be to challenge EU procedure – Hungary opted for this course 
of action in the procurements relating to Budapest-Belgrade 
railway, a project 85% of which is reportedly financed by the 
Exim Bank of China, although the terms of the loan agreement 
are classified (Inotai, 2020). The decision caused the European 
Commission to launch an infringement procedure against 
Hungary in 2016. Still, it should be noted that infringement 
procedures are not that uncommon in the EU. Therefore, 
the major argument against cooperation in infrastructure on 
Chinese terms in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has not entirely 
been the impossibility of such action, but rather a conscious 
governmental decision to act in concert with Brussels (see 
Chapter 2). Ultimately, the position of both Baltics and Hungary 
was determined by the domestic political reality, in the Baltic 
case dictated by Euro-reliance, but in the Hungarian case, as 
Hungary’s former European Commissioner P. Balazs notes: 
“The Budapest-Belgrade railway is just another opportunity for 
Orban to annoy the West and prove that he can have allies and 
partners outside the EU” (quoted in: Inotai, 2020).
As a result of several rounds of negotiations throughout 
2013-2016, China realized that infrastructure loans were not 
a feasible model of cooperation with the Baltic region, shifted the 
offer away from infrastructure lending and focused on the potential of 
high-value-added investment and cooperation in transport, logistics, 
tourism, and fintech with the Baltic states (The Sofia Guidelines 
for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries, 2018).
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Admittedly, the 2016 project of the Latvian BRI Memorandum of 
Understanding still states China’s interest in financing infrastructure 
in the Nordic-Baltic region: “The two Participants will facilitate 
participation of Chinese financial companies in financing private, 
governmental and regional projects in Baltic and Nordic countries by 
expanding cooperation between their state-owned and commercial 
financial institutions” (Protokollēmuma projekts, 2016). And yet, 
the Baltic states explicitly turned down China’s proposals regarding 
infrastructure loans, regardless of the interest of the latter in the 
massive Rail-Baltica project.
Currently, there are no China-financed infrastructure projects – 
neither on national nor international levels – taking place in the Baltic 
states. Some controversy is arising due to a plan to build a Tallinn-
Helsinki tunnel with one third of the project cost – 15 billion Euros – 
provided by Chinese “Touchstone Capital Partners” as investment, 
making the company a minority stakeholder (Tallinn-Helsinki rail 
tunnel secures 15 billion euros of funding, 2019), and two thirds in the 
form of a loan. Furthermore, the MoU for building the project includes 
3 Chinese state enterprises: China Railway International Group, China 
Railway Engineering Company, China Communications Construction 
Company. If this project will be launched, it will have the potential 
to tilt the Baltic financial resilience in China’s favour. However, this 
endeavour is under criticism from Estonian officials (Quinn, 2020).
Conclusions
Since the beginning of China’s initiatives in Central and Eastern 
Europe, three distinct risks have been voiced by various Western 
actors, namely, Beijing as a legitimating factor for strains on 
democracy; increased presence of the Chinese interpretation of 
values; and debt arising from infrastructure loans. The Baltic region 
is a valuable case for research, as none of the risks associated with 
an increased Chinese involvement have transpired in the region. 
Hence, the paper analyses Baltic resilience along three intertwining 
domains – systemic, discursive and financial.
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On the systemic spectrum, regardless of engagement with 
China, governments and populations of the three Baltic states have 
been and remain explicitly Euro-optimistic and strongly rooted in 
the values of the Euro-Atlantic community. There are three distinct 
characteristics of the Baltic political culture that could account for 
the systemic resilience – anti-authoritarian sentiment due to the 
domestic interwar historical background, Euro-optimism due to 
the lack of political autonomy and economic development during 
the Soviet period, and pro-Atlanticism due to the deterring role 
of NATO vis-à-vis Russia in the region after 2004, and especially 
since 2014.
From the point of view of discursive Chinese presence, the 
official documents signed between the Baltics and China in the 
BRI framework contain traits of the Chinese official political 
discourse – more so than the documents signed by, e.g. Italy. There 
is evidence to suggest that Chinese officials have been using the 
new China-introduced platforms to introduce Chinese political 
and societal values that stem from the domestic political agenda 
of the PRC, such as “community of shared destiny”, “dialogue of 
civilizations”, “Silk Road spirit” et al. Nevertheless, Lithuanian, 
Latvian, and Estonian example demonstrates that it is possible to be 
involved in a pragmatic dialogue with China without subscribing to 
Chinese keywords and discourse on political values and remaining 
loyal to the EU value outlook.
Finally, in the financial resilience domain, the Baltic states 
expressed that PRC infrastructure loans are practically implausible 
due to the availability of grant-based EU co-financing for 
infrastructure projects, as well as the impossibility to issue state 
guarantees and ensure a 50% Chinese component minimum 
during the procurement. Still, the EU as a restrictive factor does 
not fully account for the absence of China-financed infrastructure 
in the region. Other EU members have opted for China-banked 
infrastructure even in the face of EC infringement procedures. The 
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Baltic states exercised their agency and made a conscious decision 
to stick to EU rules. As a result of several rounds of negotiations 
throughout 2013-2016, China realized that infrastructure loans 
were not a feasible model of cooperation with the Baltic region, 
shifted the offer away from infrastructure lending. Currently, there 
are no China-financed infrastructure projects – neither on national 
nor international levels – taking place in the Baltic states.
The Baltic resilience offers OSCE an analytical toolkit for 
assessing the results of bilateral and multilateral engagement of 
China with OSCE members, as well as third countries. As the 
“EU-OSCE-China security nexus” (Weidenfeld & Huotari, 2016) 
has emerged in Central Asia, the three domains of resilience to 
China’s influence – systemic, discursive and financial – can serve 
as a point of departure for gain/risk assessment of cooperation 
with China in the mutually proclaimed areas of common interest, 
namely, migration, the fight against terrorism, economic and 
environmental development and climate change (In visit to China, 
OSCE PA President Muttonen highlights areas of mutual interest, 
future co-operation, 2017).
In conclusion, it appears that the governments that choose to 
be systemically, discursively and financially supportive or, on the 
opposite, unaccommodating towards China, are doing so based 
on their own political agendas, dictated by pre-existing domestic 
settings, rather than by direct Chinese pressure. Therefore, 
ultimately, the key to resilience lies in the hands of the state actors 
themselves.
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Берзиня-Черенкова У.О. Стійкість Балтії до принципу “розділяй 
і володарюй” у Китаї. – Стаття.
У статті розглядається взаємодія країн Балтії – Естонії, Латвії та Литви – 
з Китаєм у форматі Ініціативи “Один пояс, один шлях” (BRI). При дослі-
дженні застосовано якісні підходи до даних, включаючи аналіз дискурсу, аналіз 
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документів та історичний аналіз. До первинних джерел належать документи, 
угоди та заяви чиновників з Китаю, країн Балтії, Італії та ЄС, а також вторинні 
джерела, включаючи наукові публікації, повідомлення у ЗМІ та взаємопорівню-
вальні національні показники. Авторкою охарактеризовано три найпоширеніші 
критичні підходи до BRI, а саме: 1) ризик того, що Пекін стане легітимуючим 
фактором напруження у сфері забезпечення демократії, свободи та верховен-
ства права; 2) підтримка китайської інтерпретації цінностей та терпимості до 
цензури; 3) заборгованість за кредитами на інфраструктуру. Далі у статті вста-
новлюється, наскільки країни Балтії залишалися стійкими до цих факторів, 
пропонуються можливі пояснення балтійських випадків за трьома напрям-
ками: системна стійкість, дискурсивна стійкість та фінансова стійкість. У статті 
робиться висновок про те, що BRI набуває різних форм у різних регіонах, і що 
місцева політична культура, поряд із більш широкими наднаціональними орга-
нізаціями, визначає діапазон та реакцію на BRI. Тому національні інституційні 
рамки у поєднанні з контролем з боку наднаціональних установ, що забезпечу-
ють додержання стандартів, є провідними факторами стійкості країн до ризи-
ків, пов’язаних з BRI. Підсумовуючи, авторка зазначає, що уряди, які вирішили 
підтримувати системно, дискурсивно та фінансово або, навпаки, демонструють 
неприхильне ставлення до Китаю, роблять це на основі власних політичних 
програм, продиктованих раніше існуючими внутрішніми установками, а не пря-
мим тиском зі сторони Китаю. Тому, врешті-решт, ключ до стійкості перебуває 
у руках самих державних суб’єктів.
Ключові слова: “Один пояс, один шлях”, Китай, країни Балтії, стійкість, 
інститути.
Берзиня-Черенкова У.А. Устойчивость Балтии к принципу “разделяй 
и властвуй” в Китае. – Статья.
В статье рассматривается взаимодействие стран Балтии – Эстонии, 
Латвии и Литвы – с Китаем в формате Инициативы “Один пояс, один путь” 
(BRI). При исследовании применены качественные подходы к данным, 
включая анализ дискурса, анализ документов и исторический анализ. К пер-
вичным источникам относятся документы, соглашения и заявления чинов-
ников из Китая, стран Балтии, Италии и ЕС, а также вторичные источники, 
включая научные публикации, сообщения в СМИ и взаимносравниваемые 
национальные показатели. Автором охарактеризованы три наиболее распро-
страненные критические подходы к BRI, а именно: 1) риск того, что Пекин 
станет легитимирующим фактором напряженности в сфере обеспечения 
демократии, свободы и верховенства права; 2) поддержка китайской интер-
претации ценностей и терпимости к цензуре; 3) задолженность по креди-
там на инфраструктуру. Далее в статье устанавливается, насколько страны 
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Балтии оставались устойчивыми к этим факторам, предлагаются возможные 
объяснения балтийских случаев по трем направлениям: системная устой-
чивость, дискурсивная устойчивость и финансовая устойчивость. В статье 
делается вывод о том, что BRI принимает различные формы в разных регио-
нах, и местная политическая культура, наряду с более широкими наднацио-
нальными организациями, определяет диапазон и реакцию на BRI. Поэтому 
национальные институциональные рамки в сочетании с контролем со сто-
роны наднациональных учреждений, обеспечивающих соблюдение стан-
дартов, являются ведущими факторами устойчивости стран к рискам, свя-
занным с BRI. Подытоживая, автор отмечает, что правительства, решившие 
поддерживать системно, дискурсивно и финансово или, наоборот, демон-
стрирующие неблагосклонное отношение к Китаю, делают это на основании 
собственных политических программ, продиктованных ранее существую-
щими внутренними установками, а не прямым давлением со стороны Китая. 
Поэтому, в конце концов, ключ к устойчивости находится в руках самих госу-
дарственных субъектов.
Ключевые слова: “Один пояс, один путь”, Китай, страны Балтии, устой-
чивость, институты.
